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CAUTION ON EXHAUSTION: THE COURTS' MISINTERPRETATION OF
THE IDEA's EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY
STUDENTS COVERED BY SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT
AND THE ADA BUT NOT BY THE IDEA
PETER J. MAHER
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA ") expressly allows
students with disabilities eligible under the IDEA to bring civil actions against
their school districts not only for violations of the IDEA but also for violations of
civil rights under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act ("Section 504') and the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA ') provided the students first exhaust their
IDEA remedies before filing their civil actions in court. However, many courts
apply this exhaustion requirement to students who are covered only by Section 504
and the ADA who are ineligible or not identified under the IDEA. This Note
argues that the courts' extension of the IDEA's exhaustion requirement to students
covered only by Section 504 and the ADA misinterprets and misapplies the
provision. The Note provides the proper interpretation of the IDEA's exhaustion
requirement with the bright line rule that the exhaustion requirement only applies
to students covered by Section 504 and the ADA who are also covered by, or
seeking coverage from, the IDEA. Otherwise, students who are covered only by
Section 504 and ADA-but not by the IDEA-are not subject to the exhaustion
requirement. This interpretation is supported by a discussion of IDEA hearings
officers' jurisdiction over purely Section 504 and ADA claims, the differences
between the procedural and substantive rights of the IDEA and those of Section
504 and the ADA, and the legislative history of the IDEA's exhaustion provision.
This Note also discusses the policy arguments relating to administrative
exhaustion of claims by students with disabilities and contains recommendations
for clarifying this muddled issue.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Three separate statutes provide protection and afford rights to public
school students with disabilities: the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act ("IDEA"),' Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
("Section 504"),2 and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 ("ADA").3 All three statutes ensure that students with disabilities
receive an appropriate education and provide procedural safeguards to their
parents.4 Section 504 and the ADA share the same eligibility criteria to
qualify as disabled and afford those students with disabilities the same
protections against discrimination.5 However, the eligibility criteria and
substantive and procedural protections of Section 504 and the ADA differ
from those of the IDEA.6
In 1986, Congress overturned the Supreme Court's decision in Smith v.
Robinson, which had held that the Education of the Handicapped Act (now
the IDEA), precluded parents from bringing claims under Section 504 if
they could have brought them under the IDEA.7 In the new statutory
provision, now codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(o, Congress expressly stated
that parents of students with disabilities may bring claims under Section
504, but if remedies under the IDEA are available, then the parents must
exhaust the IDEA's administrative procedures first8
Parents generally must exhaust the IDEA's administrative procedures
for IDEA claims,9 and the exhaustion requirement of § 1415(0 applies to
. Lehigh University, M.Ed. 2007, B.A. 2005; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D.
expected 2012. 1 wish to thank Professor Deborah Calloway, University of Connecticut School of
Law, for her feedback on drafts of this Note and Professor Perry Zirkel, Lehigh University, for his
guidance on this topic and mentorship in general.
120 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2006).
2 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006).
342 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134 (2006).
4 See infra Part I1.
5 See infra Section II.B.
6 See infra Section V.B.2.
7 Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1021 (1984); see also infra Part III.
820 U.S.C. § 1415(0 (2006).
9 Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 326-27 (1988).
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the claims of parents of students protected by the IDEA who bring claims
under Section 504 or the ADA.10 However, courts erroneously extend the
exhaustion requirements of § 1415() to Section 504 and ADA claims by
parents of students covered solely by Section 504 and the ADA, thereby
compelling these parents to exhaust the IDEA administrative hearing
process." This misapplication results not only in the likely increase in the
length of time and cost spent reaching a resolution, but also in the
possibility that once these parents attempt to utilize the IDEA's hearing
procedures, the IDEA hearing officers may dismiss the Section 504 or
ADA claims because they do not have jurisdiction to hear purely Section
504 or ADA claims. As a result, some parents seeking relief for alleged
disability discrimination on behalf of their children must use an
administrative process not designed or intended to resolve their disputes
before they proceed to court. These inefficiencies waste public tax money
in the form of school district, administrative, and judicial resources and,
more importantly, force students with disabilities with legitimate claims of
discrimination to wait needlessly for redress.
This Note shows how the courts have misapplied the exhaustion
requirements of § 1415() to Section 504 and ADA claims made by parents
of students not covered by the IDEA. Courts have overlooked the
differences in the eligibility criteria, provision of educational services, and
procedural safeguards as provided in Section 504 and the ADA as
compared to those provided in the IDEA and generally have insisted that a
party with any claims relating to a student with a disability must first
exhaust the IDEA's administrative procedures. This Note will show that
this misinterpretation of § 1415(l) misapplies the overlapping, but
independent, procedural safeguards of the IDEA to Section 504 and the
ADA and subsequently compels parents to comply with the IDEA's more
formal procedures even if their children are not eligible under the IDEA.
While two other commentators briefly have observed the courts' expansive
application of exhaustion to Section 504 or ADA claims by students
covered solely by Section 504 or the ADA,12 this Note provides the only
comprehensive treatment of this topic and thus fills a gap in the literature.
Part II of this Note gives an overview of the IDEA, Section 504 and
the ADA, including how they overlap and differ in terms of eligibility,
'0 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l); see also infra Section V.A.
" See infra Section V.B.2.
12 See Mark C. Weber, A New Look at Section 504 and the ADA in Special Education Cases, 16
TEx. J. C.L. & C.R. 1, 25 (2010) ("[T]o say that relief is available under IDEA [and therefore requiring
exhaustion of the IDEA's procedures] for a child who is concededly not eligible under IDEA has an
Alice-in-Wonderland quality."); Perry A. Zirkel, Section 504 and the ADA: The Top Ten Recent
Concepts/Cases, 147 WEST'S EDUC. L. REP. 761, 762 (2000) (describing the courts' expansive
application of the exhaustion requirement in cases of students covered by Section 504 and the ADA but
not by the IDEA).
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services, and procedural safeguards. Part III analyzes the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Smith v. Robinson 3 and Congress's response with the
Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986.14 Part IV describes the
relationship between eligibility under the IDEA and eligibility under
Section 504 and the ADA. Part V examines the applicability and
inapplicability of the IDEA's administrative exhaustion requirement for
Section 504 and ADA claims. It begins by providing an illustrative sample
of relevant case law. 5 It next discusses the jurisdiction of IDEA hearing
officers over purely Section 504 and ADA claims and then provides an
analysis of the procedural and substantive differences between the IDEA,
Section 504, and the ADA. Part V also proposes the proper interpretation
of the IDEA's exhaustion requirement in relation to Section 504 and ADA
claims and concludes with a discussion of the legislative history of the
IDEA's exhaustion requirement to support the proposed interpretation.
Part VI discusses policy implications and makes recommendations for
clarifying this muddled issue.
The purpose of this Note is to examine the application of the IDEA's
exhaustion requirement to Section 504 or ADA claims brought on behalf
of students who are eligible only under Section 504 and the ADA. As a
result, the scope of this Note warrants careful demarcation. First, while
this Note discusses a sample of case law addressing Section 504 or ADA
claims brought by students who are also covered by the IDEA to illustrate
the application of the IDEA's exhaustion requirement, it does not discuss
whether the IDEA provides adequate relief in those cases-a threshold
question which triggers the exhaustion requirement-for certain categories
of claims16 or for claims seeking particular remedies.' 7 Second, this Note
"3 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
14 Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796-98.
'5 For comprehensive annotations of case law involving exhaustion issues for student claims
under Section 504 and the ADA, see 1 PERRY A. ZIRKEL, SECTION 504, THE ADA AND THE SCHOOLS
Two: 11, Two:13, Two:IS-16, Two:19; Two:21, Two:23-25; Two:27-31, Two:35, Four:4-6, Four:36-
37, Four:40, Four:45, Four:49, Four:79 (2d ed. Supp. 6 2007).
6 See, e.g., M.P. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 721, 439 F.3d 865, 868 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding
exhaustion not required for claim alleging discrimination); Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. I Denver, Colo.,
233 F.3d 1268, 1274-75 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding exhaustion not required for claim seeking relief for
physical injuries); O'Hayre v. Bd. of Educ. for Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-l, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1284,
1294 (D. Colo. 2000) (holding exhaustion not required for claims alleging discrimination); see also
Lewis M. Wasserman, Delineating Administrative Exhaustion Requirements and Establishing Federal
Courts' Jurisdiction Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Lessons from the Case Law
and Proposals for Congressional Action, 29 J. NAT'L ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 349, 420-21 (2009)
(arguing for excusal of exhaustion requirements under certain circumstances); Mark C. Weber,
Disability Harassment in the Public Schools, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1079, 1138-39 (2002) (arguing
that claims for disability harassment under Section 504/ADA should not be subject to exhaustion).
17See, e.g., Witte v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 1271, 1275 (9th Cir. 1999), overruled on
other grounds by Payne v. Peninsula Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (holding
2011)
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is limited to the applicability of the IDEA's exhaustion requirement to
claims brought under Section 504 or the ADA and does not extend to
claims based on other laws such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or the Constitution.
Third, this Note does not discuss the implications of interpreting the
IDEA's exhaustion requirement as jurisdictional or as an affirmative
defense subject to waiver i8
II. FEDERAL LAWS PROTECTING STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES
A. The IDEA
Originally enacted as the Education for All Handicapped Children Act
("EAHCA") in 1975,19 the IDEA is a federal funding statute that entitles
eligible students to a free appropriate public education ("FAPE")2 ° in the
least restrictive environment. 2 1  The IDEA includes a "child find"
provision, which requires the state education agency ("SEA") or local
education agency ("LEA") to "identiffy], locatle], and evaluat[e]" each
child with a disability residing in the State.22 For a student to be eligible
for services under the IDEA, the LEA first must evaluate the student,23 and
exhaustion not required for claims seeking money damages); Jeffery Y. v. St. Mary's Area Sch. Dist.,
967 F. Supp. 852, 855 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (same).
18 Compare Payne v. Peninsula Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (overruling its
precedent and holding that the IDEA's exhaustion requirement is a claims processing provision that
defendants may assert as an affirmative defense), and Mosley v. Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 434 F.3d
527, 532-33 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ. of Skokie Sch. Dist. 68, 98 F.3d 989, 991
(7th Cir. 1996)) (holding that the IDEA's exhaustion requirement is a claims-processing rule subject to
waiver, not jurisdictional), with Polera v. Bd. of Educ. of Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 288 F.3d
478, 483 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Hope v. Cortines, 69 F.3d 687, 688 (2d Cir. 1995)) (holding that failure
to exhaust the IDEA's administrative remedies deprives courts of subject matter jurisdiction); see also
Wasserman, supra note 16, at 411-18 (discussing recent U.S. Supreme Court administrative exhaustion
jurisprudence and suggesting that courts should interpret the exhaustion of administrative remedies
requirement under the IDEA as an affirmative defense, subject to waiver). This Note's analysis is
applicable regardless of whether the IDEA's exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional or an affirmative
defense.
19 Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773. The
EAHCA amended the Education of the Handicapped Act ("EHA"), id. at 773, which provided a system
of federal funding to states for special education services, but did not contain procedural and
substantive rights for students with disabilities, see Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 91-
230, §§ 601-62, 84 Stat. 175, 175-88 (1970). The 1990 amendments renamed the act "the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act." Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103, 1141-42. This Note uses the terms EHA, EAHCA, and IDEA
interchangeably but attempts to retain the cited authority's terminology.
20 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1) (2006). The IDEA defines FAPE as "special education and related
services" that are free of charge, meet state education standards, include an appropriate school, and
conform with a student's individualized education program. Id. § 1401(9).
21Id. § 1412(a)(5).
22Id. § 1412(a)(3) (stating the child find requirement for SEAs); id. § 1413(a)(1) (stating that
LEAs must have policies, procedures, and programs consistent with the requirements of § 1412).
23 d. § 1414(a)(l)(A).
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then a team, which includes the parents, must determine whether the
student has a disability24 that falls into one or more of the enumerated
categories.25 To qualify for one of these disabilities, the IDEA regulations
require the impairment to adversely affect the student's educational
performance or to cause educational need.26 If the child meets that
criterion, the team must determine whether, as a result of that disability,
the child requires special education and related services.27 Thus, eligibility
under the IDEA requires a two-part analysis: (1) whether the student has
one of the enumerated disabilities under IDEA, and (2) if so, whether the
student needs special education and related services.
If a student is eligible under the IDEA, the LEA must implement an
individualized education program ("IEP") that includes, among other
things, annual goals based on the student's needs; an explanation of the
student's special education, related services, and accommodations; and
postsecondary goals for older students.28 The student's educational
program, embodied in the IEP,29 is a central component of a student's
FAPE.3° In Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School
District v. Rowley,3' the Supreme Court held that the IDEA's standard of
FAPE requires that an IEP must be "reasonably calculated to enable the
child to receive educational benefits" (the "Rowley standard"). 32  In
reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected an interpretation that the IDEA
requires the provision of services "sufficient to maximize each child's
potential 'commensurate with the opportunity provided other children'...
to achieve strict equality of opportunity or services" (the "commensurate
opportunity standard").33
The IDEA also contains a system of procedural safeguards that
establish parental rights to notice of and participation in educational
24 Id. § 1414(b)(4)(A).
2 Id. § 1401(3)(A). The ten disability categories contained in the IDEA statute are "intellectual
disabilities, hearing impairments (including deafiess), speech or language impairments, visual
impairments (including blindness), serious emotional disturbance ... orthopedic impairments, autism,
traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, [and] specific learning disabilities." Id.; Rosa's Law,
Pub. L. No. 111-256, § 2(b)(2)(A), 124 Stat. 2643 (2010) (amending the IDEA to replace the term
"mental retardation" with "intellectual disability"). The IDEA regulations further split the qualifying
disabilities into thirteen categories. 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c) (2010).
26 34 C.F.R. 300.8(c). Only the definition for "specific learning disability" does not expressly
require the impairment to adversely affect educational performance or cause educational need, id. §
300.8(c)(10), though such a negative effect on learning and education is implicit in the disability itself.
2720 U.S.C. § 140](3)(A).
28 Id. § 1414(d)(l)(A), (2)(A).
29 See id. § 1414(d) (describing the required components of the IEP).
'o See id. § 1401(9)(D) (stating that FAPE includes conformity with a student's IEP).
3' 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
32 Id. at 206-07.
33 Id. at 198.
20111
decisions affecting their children with disabilities.a4 Parents are entitled to
participate in the decisions involving the identification, evaluation,
educational placement, or the provision of FAPE for their child35 and are
required members of the IEP team, which develops the child's educational
program.36 An LEA must notify the parents if it proposes to change or
refuses to change any of these components.3 7
Another element of the IDEA's procedural safeguards is a dispute
resolution mechanism.38 If the parents of a child with a disability disagree
with an LEA's decision about anything involving their child's
identification, evaluation, educational placement, FAPE, or, under certain
circumstances, discipline, they may request an impartial due process
hearing.3 9 States may elect to have either a one-tier administrative hearing
system in which the SEA conducts the initial hearing or a two-tier system
in which the LEA conducts the hearing, the decision of which is appealable
to a review officer at the SEA level.40 After a hearing officer in a one-tier
system, or a review officer in a two-tier system, has issued a final decision,
the aggrieved party may file a civil action relating to their due process
complaint in state or federal court.41  Thus, as the Supreme Court has
explained, the IDEA generally requires a party to exhaust administrative
remedies before the party may bring a claim to court alleging violations of
the IDEA unless "exhaustion would be futile or inadequate. ' ' 2
B. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990
Congress enacted Section 504 and the ADA to protect the civil rights
of individuals with disabilities by prohibiting disability discrimination.43
Section 504 prohibits recipients of federal funding, including LEAs, from
14 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1), (3), (c)(1), (d).
3 Id. § 1415(b)(1).
36 Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A), (B)(i), (3)(A).
3 Id. § 1415(b)(3), (c)(1).
3
Id. § 1415(b)(6), (f).
'9 Id. § 1415(b)(6), (f), (k)(3). The parents of a child with a disability also have the option to file
a complaint alleging violations of the IDEA directly with the SEA under a complaint resolution process
("CRP") where the SEA independently reviews relevant information, makes findings and conclusions,
and may require corrective action and remedies. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.151-153 (2010). However, if the
subject of a CRP complaint overlaps with the subject of a due process hearing, the SEA must defer to
the due process hearing. Id. § 300.152(c). The DEA's due process exhaustion requirements do not
apply to the CRP, see, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Legal Boundaries for the IDEA Complaint Resolution
Process, 237 WEST'S EDUC. L. REP. 565, 567, 570 (2008) (discussing the relationship between the state
complaint resolution process and impartial due process hearings), and therefore discussion and analysis
of the CRP is beyond the scope of this Note.
40 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A), (g).
41 Id. at § 1415(i).
42 Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 326-27 (1988).
4'29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006).
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engaging in disability discrimination, 44 and Title II of the ADA prohibits
all public entities from discriminating against individuals with
disabilities a.4  Both statutes define an individual with a disability as one
whom "(A) [has] a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities . . . ; (B) [has] a record of such
impairment; or (C) [is] regarded as having such an impairment ....,,6 If a
student meets any of these eligibility criteria, both Section 504 and the
ADA protect him or her.47 As a result, this Note will use the term "Section
504/ADA" when discussing eligibility, accommodations, or discrimination
based on these statutes.
The eligibility criteria under Section 504/ADA is much broader than
that of the IDEA. a8 Unlike the IDEA, Section 504/ADA does not include
enumerated categories of impairments as a requisite for eligibility. In
addition, a student may qualify under Section 504/ADA if his or her
impairment substantially limits a major life activity even if he or she does
not require special education and related services.49 In contrast, to qualify
under the IDEA, a student must require special education and related
services as a result of his or her disability.5 ° Moreover, the United States
Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights ("OCR"), the agency
charged with enforcing the requirements of Section 504 and the ADA as
they apply to students, has opined that Section 504 also protects students
who are eligible under the IDEA. 51
44 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), (b)(2)(B).
4' 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
46 29 U.S.C. §§ 705(20)(B), 794 (cross-referencing Section 504's definition of "individual with a
disability" as an individual who has a disability as defined by the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (Supp.
III 2010)); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (Supp. 1112010) (defining "disability" under the ADA).
47 See, e.g., Miller v. Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 565 F.3d 1232, 1245 (10th Cir.
2009) (stating that, because Section 504 and Title II of the ADA have the same substantive standards,
the court will analyze them together); Weixel v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 287 F.3d 138, 146 n.6 (2d Cir.
2002) (noting that, aside from Section 504 prohibiting discrimination based "solely" on disability and
its application to federal funding recipients, as opposed to the ADA's application to public entities
generally, "the reach and requirements of both statutes are precisely the samen"). For a discussion
about student eligibility under Section 504 and the ADA and the implications of the ADA Amendments
Act, see generally Perry A. Zirkel, Step-by-Step Process § 504/ADA Eligibility Determinations: An
Update, 239 WEST'S EDUC. L. REP. 333 (2009).
48 E.g., Muller v. Comm. on Special Educ., of E. Islip Union Free Sch. Dist., 145 F.3d 95, 99 n.2
(2d Cir. 1998) (noting that Section 504 "is broader in scope" than the IDEA); MARK C. WEBER ET AL.,
SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 57 (3d ed. 2010) ("Students who are not found to
be eligible under IDEA . . .may nevertheless fall within the purview of section 504 ... or ... the
ADA."); MARK C. WEBER, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW AND LITIGATION TREATISE 1:7 (2d ed. 2002)
("[Section 504] covers an even broader population than IDEA does ...."); I ZIRKEL, supra note 15, at
One:3 ("[T]he coverage of Section 504 extends well beyond that of the IDEA.").
49 34 C.F.R. § 104.30) (2011).
50 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A) (2006).
51 See, e.g., Letter from Gerald A. Reynolds, Assistant Sec'y for Civil Rights, to Mary L.
Landrieu, U.S. Senator (July 12, 2002), available at http://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/
2011]
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In 2008, Congress passed the ADA Amendments Act ("ADAAA"),
partly in response to Supreme Court decisions that narrowly interpreted the
definition of "disability" under the ADA.52 In Sutton v. United Airlines,
Inc., 3 the Supreme Court held that determinations of whether an
individual's physical or mental impairment substantially limits a major life
activity must include corrective or mitigating measures.54 Later, in Toyota
Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams,55 the Court concluded
that the terms "substantially" and "major" "need to be interpreted strictly
to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled," and held that
for an individual's impairment to substantially limit a major life activity,
the impairment must "prevent[] or severely restrict[] the individual from
doing activities that are of central importance to most people's daily
lives. 56  Expressly rejecting those Supreme Court interpretations,57 the
ADAAA added a rule of construction provision stating that "[t]he
definition of disability... shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of
individuals ...to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of [the
ADA]." 58 The ADAAA also includes a non-exhaustive list of major life
activities that expands upon the smaller list of examples contained in the
regulations implementing the ADA and includes within the definition
"major bodily functions., 59  Additionally, the ADAAA states that "[a]n
impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would
substantially limit a major life activity when active., 60  As a result, the
ADAAA's expansion of the definition of "disability" and "major life
activity" likely will result in Section 504/ADA covering even more
students.61
guid/idea/letters/2002-3/landrieu0712023q2002.pdf ("Students eligible for services under IDEA are
also protected by Section 504."); Response to Veir, 20 IDELR 864, 867 (OCR 1993) ("[OCR] cannot
conceive of any situation in which [students eligible under the IDEA] would not also be entitled to the
protection extended by Section 504."). But see Ellenberg v. N.M. Military Inst., 572 F.3d 815, 822-24
(10th Cir. 2009) (holding that a student's eligibility under the IDEA does not automatically establish
that the student's impairment substantially limits a major life activity under Section 504 or the ADA
where the plaintiff failed to establish such facts).
52 ADA Amendment Acts of 2008, Pub. L. No, 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553.
" 527 U.S. 471 (1999).54 Id. at 482.
5 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
56 Id. at 196-98.
57 ADA Amendment Acts of 2008 § 2, 122 Stat. at 3554.
58 Id. § 4(a) at 3555 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (Supp. III 2010)).
59 Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. HI 2010)).
60 Id at 3556 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D) (Supp. III 2010)).
61 See, e.g., Nyrop v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1t, 616 F.3d 728, 734 n.4 (8th Cir. 2010) (noting that
the ADAAA broadened the definition of disability under the ADA); cf Kania v. Potter, 358 F. App'x
338, 341 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that, in the employment discrimination context, the broadened
definition of disability under the ADAAA "expands the class of employees entitled to protection under
the Rehabilitation Act").
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The regulations implementing Section 504 include a child find
provision, which requires an LEA to attempt to "identify and locate" all
students with a disability in their district and provide them and their
parents with notice of the LEAs responsibilities.62 The regulations also
require that an LEA provide FAPE to students with disabilities.63  To
comply with the FAPE mandate, the regulations require that an LEA must
provide "regular or special education and related aids and services . . .
designed to meet [the] individual educational needs of [students with
disabilities] as adequately as the needs of [students without disabilities] are
met . . ."64 The inclusion of services within the context of regular
education in addition to special education and related aids and services
differs from the definition of FAPE under the IDEA, which provides only
for special education and related services.65
The question of what constitutes FAPE under Section 504 is
unsettled.6 6 Some courts have suggested a reasonable accommodation
standard under which the cost of accommodation is a relevant factor;
however, OCR has rejected that method in favor of a needs-based approach
that does not consider cost.
67
As a third alternative, the language of the regulation may provide a
commensurate opportunity FAPE standard, which often will be a lesser
standard than FAPE under the IDEA.68 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit appeared to endorse the commensurate
opportunity standard, explaining that, unlike FAPE under IDEA, FAPE
under Section 504 "require[s] a comparison between the manner in which
the needs of disabled and non-disabled children are met ..... ,,69 The court
recognized that FAPE under the IDEA and Section 504 are similar but
emphasized that they are not identical.10 Notwithstanding this unsettled
issue of the standard of FAPE under Section 504 generally, the regulations
specify that the implementation of an IEP under the IDEA is one way to
satisfy Section 504's FAPE requirement. 71  As a result, the standard of
FAPE for students who are also eligible under the IDEA remains the
Rowley standard of reasonable calculation to confer educational benefit.72
62 34 C.F.R. § 104.32 (2011).
631 Id. § 104.33(a).
64Id. § 104.33(b).
61 See 20 U.S.C. 1401(9) (2006) (stating the IDEA's definition of FAPE); 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(b)
(stating Section 504's definition of FAPE).
66 Perry A. Zirkel, The Substantive Standard for FAPE: Does Section 504 Require Less Than the
IDEA?, 106 WEST'S EDUC. L. REP. 471,471 (1996).67 Id. at 471-73.
61 Id. at 476-77.
69 Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 933 (9th Cir. 2008).
70 Id.
7 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(b)(2) (2011).
72 See supra text accompanying note 32 (describing the Rowley standard).
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In addition, Section 504 regulations also require that in both academic
and nonacademic/extracurricular settings, the LEA must provide the
student with disabilities education and opportunities for participation with
nondisabled peers "to the maximum extent appropriate. 73 Furthermore,
the regulations require that the LEA must base the student's FAPE and
placement upon the results of an evaluation or reevaluation. 4
Section 504's regulations also contain procedural safeguards. The
regulations establish three separate dispute resolution mechanisms to
address possible violations of Section 504's mandates. First, an LEA must
establish procedural safeguards with respect to the "identification,
evaluation, or educational placement" of students with disabilities who
"need or are believed to need special instruction or related services., 75 The
procedural safeguards must include "notice, an opportunity for the parents
or guardian of the [student] to examine relevant records, an impartial
hearing with opportunity for participation by the [student's] parents or
guardian and representation by counsel, and a review procedure. 76 The
regulations state that an LEA's compliance with the IDEA's procedural
safeguards is one way in which it can meet Section 504's procedural
safeguards requirement.77 In its analysis of the final Section 504
regulations, OCR clarifies that the procedural safeguards requirement in
the regulations set forth "minimum necessary procedures" and, although
OCR recommends that LEAs use the IDEA's due process procedures as a
model to comply with Section 504's requirements, it does not require such
a practice. 7 Thus, the Section 504 regulations do not afford parties the
same procedural safeguards as those under the IDEA. For example, OCR
has opined that Section 504 does not require LEAs to allow cross-
examination during a Section 504 hearing79 in contrast to the IDEA, which
expressly provides for that right.80
As a second alternative, the Section 504 regulations allow a party
alleging discrimination to file a complaint with the U.S. Department of
Education under the same procedures as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.81
7' 34 C.F.R. § 104.34(a), (b).
74 Id. § 104.33(b)(1)(ii), § 104.35.
71 Id. § 104.36.
76 id.
77 id.
78 Analysis of Final Regulations, 34 C.F.R. § 104 App. A 25.
79 Houston (TX) lndep. Sch. Dist., 25 IDELR 163, 164 (OCR 1996).
'0 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h)(2) (2006) (providing that hearings under the IDEA must allow parties
to cross examine witnesses).
"1 34 C.F.R. § 104.61 (cross-referencing the implementing regulations for Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which establish a procedure allowing a party alleging discrimination to file a
complaint with the U.S. Department of Education, id § 100.7). Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
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Finally, as the third alternative for dispute resolution, the regulations
require that an LEA establish a grievance procedure to resolve complaints
regarding possible violations.82 In its analysis of the final regulations,
OCR explained that the regulations do not require parties to exhaust this
grievance procedure before filing a complaint with OCR for a violation of
Section 504, although it encourages parties to use the grievance procedure
and resolve disputes at the local level.83
The regulations implementing Title II of the ADA do not contain
additional substantive requirements pertaining to students with disabilities
but state that the regulations "shall not be construed to apply a lesser
standard than the standards" under Section 504 and its regulations. 4 The
ADA regulations also provide for a complaint investigation procedure
where a party alleging discrimination may file a complaint with the U.S.
Department of Education.85 Notwithstanding the administrative complaint
procedures, the regulations allow complainants to file an action at any
time.86 Title II of the ADA adopts the procedures and remedies available
under Section 504,87 which in turn adopts the procedures and remedies
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.88
III. PREEMPTION AND EXHAUSTION
A. Smith v. Robinson
In Smith v. Robinson,89 the Supreme Court addressed disagreement
among the United States Courts of Appeals as to the relationship between
claims under the EHA and under other federal provisions, including the
Constitution, § 1983, and Section 504.90 In Smith, the superintendant of an
LEA informed the parents of a child with cerebral palsy and other physical
and emotional disabilities that the LEA would no longer fund their child's
placement in a special day program based on its belief that state law
provided that a state agency was responsible for the education of students
1964 prohibits discrimination based on race, color, or national origin in programs that receive federal
assistance. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7 (2006).
82 34 C.F.R. § 104.7.
83 Analysis of Final Regulations, 34 C.F.R. § 104 App. A 12.
'28 C.F.R. § 35.103(a) (2011).
"Id. §§ 35.170-174, 35.190 (designating the U.S. Department of Education as the agency
responsible for implementing the complaint procedure for alleged disability discrimination in schools
under Title I1 of the ADA).86 Id. § 35.172(b).
8742 U.S.C. § 12133 (2006) (adopting the "remedies, procedures, and rights set forth" in 29
U.S.C. § 794a (2006)).
88 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (adopting the "remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964," 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7 (2006)).
9 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
90Id. at 1004 & n.8.
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with emotional disturbance. 9' The parents appealed the superintendent's
decision to the local school board and also filed a complaint in federal
court under § 1983 for violation of due process. 92 The parents' complaint
alleged that state regulations required the school district to provide for the
education of their child and that his placement in the special day program
should continue pending their appeal to the school board.93 The district
court issued injunctive relief requiring the LEA to continue to educate the
child in his current placement and concluded that its failure to do so would
deprive the parents and student of due process.
94
After losing their administrative appeals at the local and state levels,
the parents amended their federal complaint to allege that the LEA denied
their child FAPE under the EHA. 95 They also alleged that the state-level
administrative appeal process denied them due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment and violated the EHA because the review officer
was biased as an employee of the SEA.96 In addition, the parents sought
attorneys' fees.97 The parents subsequently amended their complaint a
second time to include violations of the Equal Protection Clause and
Section 504 and sought attorneys' fees under both provisions.98
The district court, in granting the parents declaratory and injunctive
relief, held that the LEA was responsible for paying for the student's
special education based on state law and therefore did not reach the federal
statutory and constitutional claims.99 The First Circuit affirmed.'00 The
district court then awarded the parents' attorneys' fees based on their Equal
Protection and Section 504 claims. 101 The First Circuit reversed, holding
that, given the comprehensiveness of the EHA and its lack of a fee shifting
provision, Congress had not intended to allow plaintiffs to seek attorneys
fees via § 1983 or Section 504.102
9
' Id. at 995.
92 Id.
9' Id. at 995-96.
94 Id. at 996.
9' Id. at 997.
96 Id. at 998.
97 Id. The parents' amended complaint also claimed that the local administrative due process
system in effect during their administrative proceedings violated due process under both the Fourteenth
Amendment and the EHA because the school board members heard the appeal in violation of the
newest amendments of the EHA, which Congress had enacted prior to the commencement of the
parents' case but were not yet in effect. Id. at 997 n.4, 998. The district court granted partial summary
judgment for the LEA on these claims and, on appeal, the First Circuit found the claims moot. Id. at
999, 1001. The Supreme Court addressed only the due process claim against the state review officer.
See id. at 1013-16 (discussing due process challenge to the partiality of the state review officer).
9' Id. at 1000.
99Id. at 1001.
100 Id.
'ol Id at 1001-02
'
0 2 Id. at 1002-04.
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The Supreme Court first addressed the parents' § 1983 claims and
clarified that the parents based those claims on independent constitutional
deprivations and not on violations of the EHA but noted that their
constitutional claims were "virtually identical" to their claims under the
ERA. 103 The Court concluded that Congress intended for disabled students
to bring any constitutionally based FAPE claims through the EHA's
administrative process. 1°4 The Court reasoned that the EHA "establishe[d]
an elaborate procedural mechanism" to give LEAs and SEAs the primary
responsibility for developing plans to meet the needs of students with
disabilities and therefore Congress did not intend to allow students with
disabilities to proceed directly to court with equal protection claims for
FAPE. 10 5 As a result, the Court held that:
[W]here the EHA is available to a handicapped child
asserting a right to a free appropriate public education,
based either on the EHA or on the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the ERA is the exclusive
avenue through which the child and his parents or guardian
can pursue their claim. 106
Addressing the parents' due process claims, the Court first concluded
that the parents' initial due process claim-which resulted in the injunctive
relief requiring the LEA to maintain the student's placement during the
proceedings-was not sufficiently related to the parents' ultimate success
on their substantive claims. 10 7 Next, the Court concluded that the parents'
due process claim alleging bias of the state review officer was "distinctly
different" from their substantive claim regarding which agency should
fund their child's education.'0 8 As a result, the Court concluded that the
parents' prevailing, non-fee claim did not entitle the parents to attorneys'
fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 simply because they asserted a due process
claim through § 1983.109
Turning to the parents' Section 504 claims, the Court opined that it
was clear "that the remedies, rights, and procedures Congress set out in the
EHA are the ones it intended to apply to a handicapped child's claim to
[FAPE]" and that "Congress did not intend a handicapped child to be able
to circumvent the requirements or supplement the remedies of the EHA by
103 Id. at 1008-09.
'04Id at 1009.
10" Id. at 1010-11.
106 Id. at 1013.




resort to the general antidiscrimination provision of § 504."'10 The Court
explained that a Section 504 claim added nothing to the parents' EHA
FAPE claim and that the only benefit of bringing a Section 504 claim
would be the possibility of circumventing the EHA by proceeding straight
to court, where there would be the possibility of money damages and
attorneys' fees, which were unavailable under the EHA."'1 In conclusion,
the Court held that when a remedy that "might be provided under § 504 is
provided with more clarity and precision under the EHA, a plaintiff may
not circumvent or enlarge on the remedies available under the EHA by
resort to § 504."l12
In dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens,
rejected the majority's conclusion that Congress intended to repeal
remedies available under § 1983 and Section 504 for claims that overlap
with the EHA." 3  The dissent found that the majority's conclusion
conflicted with principles of statutory construction and had no basis in the
legislative history of the ERA. 1 4  It acknowledged the conflict among
§ 1983, Section 504, and the EHA but concluded that the proper resolution
was to require a plaintiff who brought a claim covered by the EHA to seek
relief through the EHA's administrative mechanism before pursuing relief
under § 1983 or Section 504 in the courts.' 15
B. The Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986
In response to the Supreme Court's holding in Smith v. Robinson,
Congress passed the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986
("HCPA") to amend the ERA. 1 6 In addition to adding a provision to the
ERA that allowed courts to award reasonable attorney fees to prevailing
parents or guardians, 1 7 the HCPA expressly allowed parents to bring
claims under other federal laws protecting the rights of students with
disabilities." 8 The current version of this provision in the IDEA, codified
at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l), states:
"oId. at 1019.
.. Id. at 1019-20.
112 Id. at 1021. In Irving Independent School District v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883 (1984), decided the
same day as Smith, the Court rejected parents' attempt to obtain attorneys' fees through Section 504 for
a claim that they could have brought under the EHA. Id. at 895. Relying on Smith, the court explained
that "§ 504 is inapplicable when relief is available under the Education of the Handicapped Act to
remedy a denial of educational services." Id.
... Smith, 468 U.S. at 1025-26, 1030 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1
4 Id. at 1024-25, 1030.
.. Id. at 1023-24.
116 Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796; S. REP.
No. 99-112, at 2 (1985); H.R. REP. No. 99-296, at 4, 15 (1985).
117 Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986 § 2, 100 Stat. at 796 (codified as amended at
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2006)).
.1. Id. § 3, 100 Stat. at 797 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(/)).
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Nothing in [the IDEA] shall be construed to restrict or
limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under
the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, [Section 504], or other Federal laws protecting the
rights of children with disabilities, except that before the
filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is
also available under [the IDEA], the procedures under [the
IDEA's impartial due process hearing and appeals
provisions] shall be exhausted to the same extent as would
be required had the action been brought under [the
IDEA]. "9
Thus, the HCPA rejected the holding in Smith v. Robinson that the
EHA preempted other laws affording rights to students with disabilities. 20
Although § 1415() grants parents the right to file civil actions based on
other federal laws, such as Section 504/ADA, it requires that they must
first exhaust the remedies available under IDEA's administrative due
process system if they are seeking relief that is also available under the
IDEA. "2' It is this qualification that courts have misinterpreted and
misapplied.
IV. STUDENTS' COVERAGE UNDER THE IDEA AND SECTION 504/ADA
A. Students Eligible Under Both the IDEA and Section 504/ADA
Students with a disability who meet the eligibility criteria of the IDEA
generally also meet the eligibility criteria of Section 504/ADA.'22 As a
result, these "double covered" students have rights under both the IDEA
and Section 504/ADA. Since the enactment of the HCPA, which
overturned Smith v. Robinson and declared that the IDEA does not preempt
claims based on Section 504/ADA,"' parents of double covered students
may bring claims based on violations of the IDEA or Section 504/ADA. 124
"9 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).
20 S. REP. No. 99-112, at 2 (stating that Congress intended the HCPA to overturn Smith v.
Robinson's holding that the EHA preempted other federal laws protecting the rights of individuals with
disabilities); H.R. REP. No. 99-296, at 4, 15 (same).
12 20 US.C. § 1415(1).
122 See, e.g., Letter from Gerald A. Reynolds, Assistant Sec'y for Civil Rights, to Mary L.
Landrieu, U.S. Senator (July 12, 2002) (on file with author), available at
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/etters/2002-3/landrieuO7l2023q2002.pdf ("Students
eligible for services under IDEA are also protected by Section 504."); Response to Veir, 20 IDELR
864, 867 (OCR 1993) ("[OCR] cannot conceive of any situation in which [students eligible under the
IDEA] would not also be entitled to the protection extended by Section 504.").
123 See supra Section III.B.
124 See, e.g., Miller v. Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 565 F.3d 1232, 1246 (10th Cir.
2009) (explaining that a violation of the IDEA is not per se discrimination under Section 504/ADA);
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For example, in Weixel v. Board of Education of the City of New York,'25
the parent of a student with chronic fatigue syndrome and fibromyalgia
sought accommodations for her daughter who, due to her illness, was
unable to attend school. 126 The student's LEA met the parent's request for
accommodations for her daughter with hostility. A school administrator
threatened to, and eventually did, report the parent to the state's child
welfare agency due to the child's absences from school-despite having
medical diagnoses and recommendations for the student to stay home-
and refused to place the student in advanced classes despite her
outstanding academic performance. 127  In reversing the district court's
dismissal of the parent's complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held the parent sufficiently pled facts to state claims for
violations of both Section 504/ADA and the IDEA.1
28
In addition, certain violations of a student's IDEA rights could also be
violations of Section 504/ADA. For example, in Ridgewood Board of
Education v. N.E. ,129 a parent of an IDEA-eligible student alleged a denial
of FAPE under the IDEA and discrimination for violations of Section 504
for the LEA's failures to identify the student as learning disabled, inform
the parents of its duties under IDEA, and provide FAPE. 130  The Third
Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment for the LEA
on the student's Section 504 claims and noted that an LEA's failure to
inform parents of its IDEA responsibilities and to identify a student with a
disability could amount to violations of Section 504 and that a denial of
FAPE "violates IDEA and therefore could violate Section 504.''
B. Students Eligible Only Under Section 504/ADA
Given the broader definition of "disability" under Section 504/ADA,
students with physical or mental impairments who do not meet the
eligibility criteria under the IDEA still may be eligible under Section
504/ADA. 3 2  For example, some students with attention
Loren F. v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 349 F.3d 1309, 1319-20 (1 1th Cir. 2003) (holding that the trial
court erred by rejecting a parent's Section 504 claim based on its rejection of the IDEA claim);
Piedmont Behavioral Health Ctr. v. Stewart, 413 F. Supp. 2d 746, 751-57 (S.D. W. Va. 2006)
(discussing both claims of IDEA violations and discrimination claims under Section 504/ADA).
125 287 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2002).
126 Id at 142.
127 1d. at 142-44.
121 Id. at 152.
29 172 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 1999).
130 Id at 253.
131 Id. (citing W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 492-93, 500-01 & n.13 (3d Cir. 1995), overruled on
other grounds by A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs, 486 F.3d 791, 799 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc)).
132 See, e.g., Northshore (WA) Sch. Dist. No. 417, 20 IDELR 1266, 1267-68 (OCR 1993)
(finding LEA complied with Section 504/ADA by offering a program of services to meet a student's
needs who had a disability but who did not qualify for IDEA services); Response to Veir, 20 IDELR
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deficit/hyperactivity disorder ("ADHD") might not meet the eligibility
standards under the IDEA because their impairment does not adversely
affect their educational performance. However, if those students' ADHD
substantially limited a major life activity, they would qualify for protection
under Section 504/ADA.'33 Similarly, students with medical conditions
such as asthma, 134 asthmatic bronchitis, 135 diabetes, 136 encopresis, 137 and
juvenile rheumatoid arthritis'38 may qualify as disabled under Section
504/ADA but might be ineligible under the IDEA if the impairments do
not adversely affect their educational performance or they do not need
special education. Thus, a class of students with disabilities exists who are
entitled to the protection of Section 504/ADA but not to the protection of
the IDEA.'39
V. THE APPLICABILITY AND INAPPLICABILITY OF § 1415() OF THE IDEA
TO SECTION 504/ADA
A. Students Covered by the IDEA and Section 504/ADA
Section 1415() of the IDEA 140 clearly applies to students who are
864, 867 (OCR 1993) (stating that students who do not meet the eligibility criteria under the IDEA may
or may not meet the eligibility under Section 504); Response to Anonymous, 18 IDELR 229, 229-30
(OCR 1991) (explaining that a student who is not eligible under the IDEA may require special
education under Section 504 if he or she meets Section 504's eligibility requirements); U.S. Dep't of
Educ. Joint Policy Memorandum, 18 IDELR 116, 117 (OSERS/OCR/OSEP 1991) ("[Tjhe protections
of Section 504 extend to some children who do not fall within the disability categories specified in [the
IDEA].").
13 E.g., Response to Williams, 21 IDELR 73, 76 (OCR 1994); Response to Rahall, 21 IDELR
575, 577 (OCR 1994); U.S. Dep't of Educ. Joint Policy Memorandum, 18 IDELR 116, 117
(OSERS/OCR/OSEP 1991); Pembina (ND) Pub. Sch. Dist. #1, 18 IDELR 225, 226 (OCR 1991);
Ventura (CA) Unified Sch. Dist., 17 EHLR 854, 857 (OCR 1991); see also Maine Sch. Admin. Dist.
#70, 51 IDELR 83, at 459-60 (OCR 2008) (finding that an LEA violated Section 504 when it
considered a student with ADHD only for eligibility under the IDEA but did not consider the student's
eligibility under Section 504/ADA).
134 E.g., Culver City (CA) Unified Sch. Dist., 16 EHLR 673, 674 (OCR 1990); cf. Yorktown (NY)
Cent. Sch. Dist., 16 EHLR 108, 109 (OCR 1989) (determining that a student with a record of asthma
qualifies as a student with a disability under Section 504).
135 E.g., Burbank (IL) Sch. Dist. #111, 18 IDELR 284, 284 (OCR 1991).
136 E.g., Gasconade Cnty. (MO) R-I Sch. Dist., 18 IDELR 313, 314 (OCR 1991); N.Y. City Bd. of
Educ., 16 EHLR 455, 455 (OCR 1989); Bement (IL) Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. #5, EHLR 353:383, 384
(OCR 1989).
13 See, e.g., Great Valley (PA) Sch. Dist., 16 EHLR 101, 103-04 (OCR 1989) (finding that an
LEA violated Section 504 by failing to evaluate a student with encopresis).
138 Linden (CA) Unified Sch. Dist., EHLR 352:617, 617-19 (OCR 1988) (finding that an LEA
violated Section 504 when it did not conduct a physical therapy evaluation for a student with juvenile
rheumatoid arthritis based on the LEA's policy that prohibited physical therapy evaluations for students
not eligible under the IDEA).
B39 Indeed this class of students likely will expand with the passage of the ADAAA. See supra
note 58 and accompanying text.
140 20 U.S.C. § 1415(/) (2006).
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double covered by both the IDEA and Section 504/ADA or who are
seeking the protections of both the IDEA and Section 504/ADA. A parent
of a student eligible under the IDEA has a right to request a due process
hearing to challenge certain disciplinary decisions or the identification,
evaluation, educational placement, or the provision of FAPE under the
IDEA. 14' If a parent believes that an LEA also has discriminated against
his or her child based on the child's disability, § 1415(l) provides that the
parent also may file a complaint alleging violations of Section
504/ADA. 142 However, § 1415() qualifies that, if a parent is seeking relief
under Section 504/ADA that is also available under the IDEA, then the
parent must exhaust the IDEA's administrative due process procedures
before filing a civil action in court. 14 3 The IDEA permits parents to file a
due process complaint "with respect to any matter relating to the
identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the
provision of [FAPE]." 144 As a result, in applying § 1415(l) to Section
504/ADA claims by parents of double covered students, courts inquire
whether the relief the parents are seeking under Section 504/ADA would
also be available under the IDEA and therefore often look to whether the
parent's Section 504/ADA claim relates to the student's identification,
evaluation, placement, or provision of FAPE. However, courts' analyses
are not always consistent.
This inconsistency is apparent in courts' conclusions as to whether
parents of double covered students must exhaust IDEA's procedures for
Section 504/ADA claims seeking money damages. Some courts have held
that parents seeking money damages under Section 504/ADA must exhaust
their remedies under the IDEA. For example, in Charlie F. v. Board of
Education of Skokie School District 68, 14 the parents of a double covered
student sued their LEA for money damages under Section 504/ADA after
the student's teacher invited her other students to vent their feelings and
complaints about the student, alleging psychological harm to the child.
146
The Seventh Circuit held that, although money damages are not available
under the IDEA, the parents should have exhausted the IDEA's
administrative remedies. 147  The court concluded "the genesis and
manifestations of the problem [were] educational" and "that at least in
M4l 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6), (f), (k)(3).
142 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415() (stating that the IDEA does not limit the rights, procedures, and
remedies under, inter alia, Section 504/ADA).
143 See id. (requiring a party to exhaust the IDEA's administrative procedures before filing a claim
under other laws protecting individuals with disabilities).
'44Id. § 1415(b)(6).
141 98 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 1996).
14 Id. at 990-91.
147 Id. at 991, 993.
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principle relief [was] available under the IDEA.' ' 148 Similarly, the Second
Circuit held that a double covered student should have used the IDEA's
procedures to exhaust her Section 504/ADA claim for money damages
based on allegations that the LEA denied the student FAPE by failing to
provide study materials, compensation for tutoring, and recognition of
academic achievements. 149 The court reasoned that the IDEA could have
provided other forms of relief that the student sought based on a denial of
FAPE, even though money damages are not available under the IDEA.
50
In addition, the Ninth Circuit has held that, although monetary relief is not
available under the IDEA, the parents of a double covered student should
have exhausted their remedies for their Section 504/ADA claims seeking
money damages. 51 The court found that the parents based their claims on
underlying educational issues that were unresolved and, as a result, the
IDEA's administrative remedies might have provided adequate relief.
52
On the other hand, other courts have held that Section 504/ADA
claims for money damages do not require exhaustion of the IDEA's
administrative procedures. For example, a different Ninth Circuit panel
held that parents of a double covered student did not have to exhaust IDEA
remedies for their Section 504/ADA claims seeking money damages for
alleged physical, psychological, and verbal abuse.5 3 The court based its
conclusion on the fact that money damages are not available under the
IDEA, and that the parents and the LEA had already resolved the
educational issues through the IEP process and therefore the requested
relief was not "also available" under the IDEA. 154 The Tenth Circuit also
held that exhaustion was unnecessary for a Section 504/ADA claim
seeking money damages filed by parents of a double covered student.
155
The court determined that relief was not available under the IDEA because
the money damages the parents sought were for physical injuries and the
parents asserted that the student's current LEA met her educational
needs. 15
6
Courts have also been inconsistent in determining whether Section
504/ADA claims of discrimination are subject to the IDEA's exhaustion
requirement. For example, the Second Circuit held that parents who
141 Id. at 993.
149 Polera v. Bd. of Educ. of Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 288 F.3d 478, 480-81, 491 (2d
Cir. 2002).
150 Id. at 486, 488.
15' Kutasi v. Las Virgenes Unified Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 1162, 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2007).
152 1d. at 1169.
153 Witte v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 1271, 1272-75 (9th Cir. 1999), overruled on other
grounds by Payne v. Peninsula Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
154 Id. at 1275 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(1) (2006)).
155 Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,233 F.3d 1268, 1270, 1275 (10th Cir. 2000).
156 Id. at 1274.
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brought a Section 504/ADA claim for discrimination should have
exhausted their remedies under the IDEA's procedures. 57 The parents
based their claims on discrimination because the LEA refused to allow the
student to use a service dog at school, but they did not allege that the IEP
was inadequate or that the LEA denied the student FAPE. 58 However, the
court recast their claim as one challenging the IEP and therefore concluded
relief was available under the IDEA. 9
In contrast, the Eighth Circuit held that the parents of a double covered
student were not required to exhaust their Section 504/ADA discrimination
claim before filing in court. 160  In that case, the parents alleged
discrimination based on the school nurse's disclosure that the student had
schizophrenia, resulting in harassment by students.' 6' The court concluded
that that the LEA's alleged failure to protect the student from unlawful
disability discrimination was "wholly unrelated to the IEP process" and to
the identification, evaluation, placement, and provision of FAPE under the
IDEA.
162
The foregoing cases in this subsection involved students who received
IDEA services and, therefore, are not directly applicable to the issue of
exhaustion for students covered only by Section 504/ADA. Nonetheless,
the cases highlight the courts' inconsistencies and likely confusion in
attempting to distinguish and reconcile IDEA and Section 504/ADA
claims. Despite the courts' inconsistent results, it is clear that § 1415()
applies to Section 504/ADA claims by parents whose children receive or
are seeking services under the IDEA. Students protected by, or seeking the
protection of, the IDEA are subject to its provisions, including § 1415().
To determine whether a parent of a double covered student must exhaust
the IDEA's administrative procedures for a claim based on Section
504/ADA pursuant to § 1415(), the threshold question is whether the
IDEA could provide relief for those claims. For those cases, whether
requested relief for certain Section 504/ADA claims is also available under
the IDEA or whether the IDEA's administrative process would be futile or
its relief inadequate are separate questions. 163  While courts' answers to
those questions are inconsistent, the application of § 1415() is proper.
157 Cave v. E. Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist., 514 F.3d 240, 244, 247, 250 (2d Cir. 2008).
1.. Id. at 243-44, 247.
"9 Id. at 247-48.
160 M.P. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 721, 439 F.3d 865, 867-68 (8th Cir. 2006).
161 Id. at 866.
162 Id. at 868.
163 See, e.g., Weber, supra note 16, at 1138-39 (arguing that claims for disability harassment
under Section 504/ADA should not be subject to exhaustion); Wasserman, supra note 16, at 420-21,
425 (arguing for excusal of exhaustion requirements under certain circumstances).
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B. Students Eligible Only Under Section 504/ADA
1. IDEA Hearing Officers' Jurisdiction to Hear Section 504/ADA
Claims by Students Eligible Solely Under Section 504/ADA
While students protected by the IDEA are subject to its provisions,
including § 1415(l), the same is not true for students whom the IDEA does
not reach-specifically students who are eligible for services under Section
504/ADA, but who are not covered by the IDEA. If a party is seeking
relief that is also available under the IDEA, Section 1415(l) requires the
parties to exhaust the IDEA's due process hearing procedures before filing
a civil action in court based on Section 504/ADA claims. 164 Parties may
bring a complaint pursuant to the IDEA's administrative procedures based
on matters involving the identification, evaluation, educational placement,
FAPE, or, under certain circumstances, discipline of a student. 65  A
hearing officer's jurisdiction to hear a case under the IDEA's due process
provisions arises from complaints based on these issues. 166 Nothing in the
IDEA, Section 504, or ADA statutes, nor their regulations, provide that
IDEA hearing officers have jurisdiction to hear claims based solely on
Section 504/ADA violations filed by the parents of students eligible only
under Section 504/ADA. 167  Furthermore, most states do not separately
grant IDEA hearing officers jurisdiction to hear Section 504/ADA
claims.' 68 Thus, requiring a party to exhaust the IDEA's administrative
procedures in those jurisdictions would be futile.
For example, in one case in Nevada, a guardian filed a suit against an
LEA for failure to develop a Section 504 accomodation plan and the lack
of notice of procedural safeguards. 169 A federal district court dismissed the
suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under § 1415(l).170
Subsequently, the guardian requested a hearing under Section 504 but later
clarified that she was requesting a hearing under both Section 504 and the
IDEA, 171 presumably in an attempt to satisfy the § 1415() requirement.
'64 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2006).
16 Id. § 1415(b)(6)(A), (f)(1)(A), (k)(3).
' See id. § 1415(f)(1)(A) (providing for the opportunity for a hearing based on complaints
involving identification, evaluations, placement, FAPE, and discipline).
167 See id § 1415(b)(6), (0, (k) (making no reference to IDEA hearing officers hearing claims of
Section 504/ADA violations); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006) (same); 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2006) (same); 28
C.F.R. §§ 35.170-72 (2011) (same); 34 C.F.R. § 104.36 (2011) (same); id §§ 300.507, 300.511-14
(2010) (same).
168 See Perry A. Zirkel & Brooke L. McGuire, A Roadmap to Legal Dispute Resolution for
Students with Disabilities, 23 J. OF SPECIAL EDuc. LEADERSHIP 100, 106 (2010) ("[Rielatively few
states.. . have opened their IDEA [impartial due process hearing] systems to claims under § 504 that
are alternative to or instead of those under the IDEA.").
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The IDEA hearing officer determined that she had jurisdiction to hear
claims alleging discrimination under Section 504, framing the guardian's
claim as one involving the LEA's duty to evaluate the student and
determining that sufficient evidence existed to justify an IDEA
evaluation. 72  On appeal, a state review officer found that the IDEA
hearing officer erred in exercising jurisdiction over purely Section 504
issues. 173 The review officer held that "[i]n order for an IDEA hearing
officer to have Jurisdiction [sic] the child must be identified as a student
with disabilities under the [IDEA] or seeking such identification through
the hearing process" and recognized that "the hearing processes provided
under Section 504 and IDEA respectively are separate.' 74  The review
officer further explained that,
[flor an IDEA hearing officer to have jurisdiction over a
claim, it must involve a "matter" "related" to the
"identification, evaluation, or educational placement" of
the subject child or "the provision of a free appropriate
public education to the child["] .... If a Section 504 issue
is part of an issue raised under IDEA, it is no longer a
Section 504 issue, but rather an IDEA issue.'75
In rejecting the IDEA hearing officer's justification for her exercise of
jurisdiction over the Section 504 issues, the review officer suggested that
"[p]erhaps the Hearing Officer confused ... Section 504 . . . procedures
with those required under IDEA.' 76  Thus, in attempting to fulfill
§ 1415(/)'s requirement that she exhaust IDEA's hearing procedures-as
interpreted by the district court, which originally dismissed her complaint
for lack of exhaustion-the child's guardian found that the IDEA hearing
officer did not have jurisdiction over her claims.
In another case, in Texas, parents of a student who received services
under the IDEA requested an IDEA due process hearing for violations of
the IDEA and other laws, including Section 504/ADA. 7 7  The LEA
objected to the parents' Section 504/ADA claims because, in Texas, IDEA
hearing officers lacked jurisdiction to hear non-IDEA claims, and, as a
result, the hearing officer dismissed the non-IDEA claims. The IDEAhearing occurred, but the parents subsequently filed a civil action in court
1' Id. at 719-20.
173 Id. at 720-21.
1741 d. at 720.
1751 d. at 720-21.
171 Id. at 721.
177 Wood v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 53 IDELR 10, 34, 35 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
178 Id.
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based on Section 504/ADA claims. 179 Although the hearing officer had
refused to hear the Section 504/ADA claims for lack of jurisdiction, the
federal district court found that "the theory behind" Section 504/ADA
claims fell within the IDEA and could be resolved under the IDEA's
administrative procedures. 8 ° The court therefore held that the parents
should have exhausted the IDEA's administrative remedies before filing a
civil action in court.1
81
While forcing parents of IDEA students to repackage their Section
504/ADA claims solely as IDEA claims clearly contradicts the plain
language of § 1415(),'82 parents of students eligible solely under Section
504/ADA do not have the option to repackage their Section 504/ADA as
IDEA claims because those students are not covered by the IDEA. If a
court subjects parents of students eligible solely under Section 504/ADA to
the exhaustion requirement of § 1415(), thus requiring them to utilize an
IDEA due process hearing for their Section 504/ADA claims, the potential
of an IDEA hearing officer's lack of jurisdiction over Section 504/ADA
issues may result in the parents finding both the doors of the hearing room
and courtroom closed.
As another example, the Connecticut State Department of Education
has issued guidance regarding the jurisdiction of IDEA hearing officers. In
a circular to Connecticut LEAs addressing Section 504 procedural
safeguards, the Connecticut Commissioner of Education noted that some
LEAs had been confusing Section 504's hearing requirements with those
of the IDEA. 183 The circular explained the differences between the
procedural safeguards of the two laws and clarified that IDEA hearing
officers have jurisdiction over Section 504 claims "only as necessary to
resolve the claims made under the IDEA."' 84 Citing the previous version
of the circular, a Connecticut hearing officer explained that generally,
IDEA hearing officers "will not hear what is commonly referred to as
'Section 504 only cases' ... .,,85
Despite the position of the Connecticut State Department of
Education, 86 courts in Connecticut continue to confuse the issues. In one
case, a mother first sought IDEA services for her two sons, and when the
179 Id.
8 0 Id. at 36.
181 id.
182 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2006) ("Nothing in [the IDEA] shall be construed to restrict or limit the
rights, procedures, and remedies available under.., the [ADA or Section 504] .... ).
183 Circular Letter C-13, Series 2008-2009, Reissue of Circular Letter C-9, Series 2000-2001,
Mark K. McQuillan, Comm'r of Educ., Conn. State Dep't of Educ., at 1 (May 20, 2009) [hereinafter
Circular C-13].
184 Id. at 2 & n.2, n.2a.
185 Student v. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 09-0537, at 3 (SEA CT Aug. 31, 2009),
http://www.sde.ct.gov/sde/lib/sde/PDF/DEPS/Specia/Hearing-Decisions/2009/09 -0537.pdf.
186 Circular C-13, supra note 183, at 2 & n.2.
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LEA found them ineligible under the IDEA, at the direction of the LEA,
the mother then sought services under Section 504.187 The LEA found one
son eligible under Section 504 and the other son ineligible under Section
504.188 For the latter, the mother filed for a due process hearing under
Section 504, and then filed complaints with OCR and in district court on
behalf of both sons for, among other things, violations of the IDEA and
Section 504/ADA. 189 The court held that the mother failed to exhaust the
IDEA's administrative procedures because she failed to request due
process hearings under the IDEA.' 90 The court further held that the
mother's participation in a Section 504 due process hearing did not satisfy
or excuse § 1415(/)'s exhaustion requirement.' 9' Citing § 1415(l), the
court explained that "[i]t is the exhaustion of the IDEA's administrative
procedures, not procedures under Section 504, that is the prerequisite for
bringing an action in federal or state court alleging the denial of a FAPE
under the IDEA, Section 504, the ADA, Section 1983, or any other cause
of action."'192 The court's holding seemed to require the exhaustion of the
IDEA's administrative procedures before filing any action in court based
on Section 504/ADA. 193  One then wonders how, in Connecticut, the
parents of a student eligible under Section 504/ADA, but ineligible under
the IDEA, can exhaust their administrative remedies through the IDEA's
procedures if Connecticut hearing officers do not have jurisdiction over
Section 504 claims unrelated to IDEA claims.
194
2. The Differences in Procedural Requirements and Substantive
Rights Between the IDEA and Section 504/ADA
In addition to the potential limitation of IDEA hearing officers not
having jurisdiction to hear Section 504/ADA claims of students who are
eligible only under Section 504/ADA, § 1415(0's exhaustion requirements
cannot apply to these students because the administrative procedures that §
1415(l) requires parties to exhaust refer to procedures based on IDEA
services and requirements. Parties may invoke the IDEA's administrative
due process procedures, to which § 1415(l) refers, based on "any matter




9ld. at *1, *3.
190 Id. at *6-7.
191 Id. at *6.
192 1d. at *6 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2006); Myslow v. New Milford Sch. Dist., No.
3:03CV496 (MRK), 2006 WL 473735, at *10 n.2 (D. Conn. Feb. 28,2006)).
193 Id.
194 See Circular C-13, supra note 183 at 2 n.2 (stating that Connecticut IDEA hearing officers do
not have jurisdiction over Section 504 claims unless those claims relate to IDEA claims); Student v.
Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 09-0537, http://www.sde.ct.gov/sde/lib/sde/PDF/DEPS/Special/
HearingDecisions/2009/09_0537.pdf, at 3 (SEA CT Aug. 31, 2009) (same).
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relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the
child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education .... 195
Identification, evaluation, educational placement, and the provision of
FAPE have specific meanings under the IDEA, which differ from their
meanings under Section 504.
First, the identification requirements under the IDEA and Section
504/ADA are different. For a student to be identified as a "child with a
disability" under the IDEA, he or she must fall within one of the
enumerated disability categories and, as a result of that disability, require
special education and related services. 196 In contrast, for a student to be an
individual with a disability under Section 504/ADA, he or she must have a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity
or have a record of such an impairment, or an LEA must regard the student
as having such an impairment.
97
Second, the evaluation requirements under the IDEA and Section
504/ADA differ. The IDEA contains specific provisions regarding who
may request an evaluation, the timeframe within which an LEA must
conduct an evaluation, the requirements for parental consent and parental
notice, and the procedures for administering assessments and determining
IDEA eligibility. 198 Section 504 regulations provide only that an LEA
must conduct an evaluation before the initial placement of a student with a
disability who needs, or is believed to need, special education and
additionally contain several requirements for the tests used for
evaluations. 199 Furthermore, the Section 504 regulations only require that
an LEA periodically reevaluate students who receive special education and
related services,2 °° thus, arguably not applying to certain students with
disabilities under Section 504/ADA who only receive regular education
services. In contrast, the IDEA requires an LEA to reevaluate a student
receiving special education services and related services under the IDEA at
least once every three years.2"'
Third, while both the IDEA and Section 504's regulations mandate that
students with disabilities must receive an education alongside peers
without disabilities and in the regular education environment to the
"maximum extent appropriate, ' 202 the procedures for determining a
19' 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A), (/).
'96Id. § 1401(3)(A).
197 29 U.S.C. §§ 705(20)(B), 794 (2006) (cross-referencing Section 504's definition of "individual
with a disability" as an individual who has a disability as defined by the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)
(Supp. II1 2008)); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (Supp. 1112008) (defining "disability" under the ADA).
198 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)-(c).
199 34 C.F.R. § 104.35(a), (b) (2011).
2 0 Id. § 104.35(d).
201 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2).
202 Id. § 1412(a)(5)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 104.34(a)-(b).
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student's educational placement differ between the laws. Under the IDEA,
an LEA must ensure that the parents are part of any group that makes
decisions about a student's educational placement. °3 In addition, the
IDEA requires that an LEA provide prior written notice to the parents
when it proposes to or refuses to initiate or change a student's educational
placement. 20 4  Furthermore, the IDEA contains provisions detailing the
authority with which an LEA may remove a student for disciplinary
reasons and when such a removal constitutes a change in the student's
educational placement.0 5 On the other hand, the Section 504 regulations
allow an LEA to place a student with a disability in a setting other than a
regular education environment if the LEA demonstrates that it cannot
educate the student satisfactorily even with supplementary aids and
206services. Moreover, Section 504's regulations do not require that the
group who makes the student's placement decisions include the student's
parents.2
07
Fourth, the definition of FAPE differs under the IDEA and Section
504/ADA. FAPE under the IDEA includes "special education and related
services" that meet the state education standards and that conform to a
student's IEP. 208 The standard for FAPE under the IDEA requires that a
student's IEP be reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit.0 9
Yet, FAPE under Section 504's regulations includes "the provision of
regular or special education and related aids and services" designed to
meet the needs of students with disabilities "as adequately as the needs of'
students without disabilities.10
Thus, the procedures and substantive requirements for the
identification, evaluation, educational placement, and FAPE for students
receiving services under the IDEA differ from the provisions for the
identification, evaluation, educational placement, and FAPE for students
receiving services only under Section 504/ADA. Students who receive
services only under Section 504/ADA and who are ineligible for services
under the IDEA are not entitled to the IDEA's more robust substantive
rights and procedural safeguards. Therefore, the IDEA's administrative
due process provisions that allow a party to bring a complaint based on
203 20 U.S.C. § 1414(e); see also id. § 1415(b)(1) (providing that, as a procedural safeguard,
parents must have an opportunity to participate in meetings regarding educational placement).
2 4Id. § 1415(b)(3).2 5 Id. § 1415(k).
206 34 C.F.R. § 104.34(a).
207 See id § 104.35(c) (stating that the group who determines a student's placement must include
persons knowledgeable about the student, persons who can interpret evaluation data, and persons
familiar with placement options).
20
' 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9).
209 Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07
(1982).
2,0 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(b).
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"any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational
placement of the child, or the provision of [FAPE] 2 11 must only be
referring to identification, evaluation, educational placement, and FAPE as
employed within the context of the IDEA-not the regulations for Section
504. As a result, based on § 1415(/)'s reference to the IDEA's
administrative due process procedures, § 1415(0's exhaustion requirement
can apply only to students who are eligible for, or are seeking eligibility
for, services under the IDEA who also allege violations of Section
504/ADA. Accordingly, parties who allege a violation of Section
504/ADA must exhaust the IDEA's administrative due process procedures,
as required by § 1415(l), only if the student is double covered by both the
IDEA and Section 504/ADA.
Nevertheless, courts, apparently confused by the procedural and
substantive similarities and differences between the IDEA and Section
504/ADA, have applied § 1415(0's requirements to students eligible only
under Section 504/ADA. As a result, in addressing a parent's Section
504/ADA claim when the student is eligible only under Section 504/ADA,
courts mistakenly analyze whether relief would have been also available
under the IDEA-if packaged as an IDEA claim-not understanding that
the IDEA can only provide relief for students eligible or seeking eligibility
under that statute.
For example, in Prins v. Independent School District No. 761,212 the
parents of a student with attention deficit disorder filed a complaint against
the LEA for violations of civil rights acts, including Section 504/ADA.2 13
The student was disabled under Section 504/ADA, but did not receive
services under the IDEA and the parents did not seek services under the
IDEA.2t 4 The parents alleged that the LEA failed to comply with their
son's Section 504 plan and a previous settlement agreement when it
applied its regular school district discipline policy to the student rather than
the individual disciplinary plan specified in the student's Section 504
plan.215 The parents sought accommodations and modifications for their
child, staff training, a court monitor, declaratory relief regarding
discriminatory implementation of the LEA's discipline procedures, and
monetary damages.216 The United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota concluded that the parents' requests for accommodations,
modifications, and staff training were essentially asking for an IEP under
21' 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6).
212 23 IDELR 544 (D. Minn. 1995).
211 Id. at 545.
214 Id. at 547.
215 Id. at 545. The parties reached this settlement agreement after the parents requested a due
process hearing under Section 504, but before the hearing commenced. Id.
216 Id. at 545, 547.
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the IDEA and interpreted the parents' request for a court monitor as a
request for an "evaluation procedure" for assessing the student's
progress. ' Thus, the court determined the parents could have brought
those claims under the IDEA.21 8 The court also found that the parents'
discrimination claim related to the LEA's disciplinary procedures, which
the parents also could have brought under the IDEA.219  The court
acknowledged that an IDEA hearing officer could not have granted
declaratory or monetary relief, but ultimately held that, because the
parents' claims sought relief that was substantially available under the
IDEA, they were required to exhaust IDEA administrative remedies.
220
The court's analysis in Prins is flawed for two reasons. First, at the
outset of its discussion, the court noted that students with disabilities have
"several statutory options for pursuing grievances" when an LEA fails to
provide adequate educational services.22' While it is true that the ADA,
222Section 504, and the IDEA all protect students with disabilities, a
student eligible under the IDEA generally may only bring educational
claims via the IDEA's due process mechanism or the state complaint
resolution process.223 On the other hand, as the court noted, Section 504
also provides for an impartial hearing and review for claims regarding
identification, evaluation, and placement. 24 The court found that the
parents "explicitly chose to bring their claims under the ADA and Section
504 and not to bring their claims under the IDEA., 225 However, given the
court's holding that, barring any recognized exemptions, the only avenue
into federal court for Section 504/ADA claims is through the IDEA's
administrative procedures, 226 the court effectively reads any "statutory
option[] ''227 out of existence.
Second, the court summarized the exhaustion requirement of what is
now § 1415() as follows:
Essentially, if parents file a suit encompassing a claim that
could have been filed under the IDEA, but chose to file
under the ADA rather than the IDEA, they are first
required to exhaust the IDEA's remedies to the same
217 Id. at 547.
218 id.
21 9 Id.
220 Id. at 549.
221 Id. at 545-46.
222 See id. at 546.
223 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6), (f) (2006); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.151-153 (2010).
224 Prins, 23 IDELR at 546 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 104.36).
221 Id. at 546.
226 Id. at 547-49.
227 Id. at 545.
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extent as if the suit had originally been filed under the
IDEA.228
In this case, the parents did not choose to file under Section 504/ADA
instead of the IDEA; both parties had previously agreed that the student
was eligible for Section 504 services and the parents made clear that they
did not seek IDEA services. 229 As a result, their claims did not relate to the
identification, evaluation, placement, or FAPE as provided in the IDEA.
The court improperly generalized that all issues relating to the
identification, evaluation, placement, and FAPE are analogous to IDEA
claims, 23° neglecting to address the different eligibility criteria, definitions
of FAPE, and evaluation and placement requirements.23'
In another case, Babicz v. School Board of Broward County,232 the
parents of two students with chronic asthma, allergies, migraine syndrome,
and sinusitis brought an action against the LEA under § 1983 for violations
of Section 504/ADA for failing to provide the students equal educational
opportunities. 33 The LEA issued both students Section 504 plans, which
included accommodations for notice of assignments and make up work
when they were absent from school and access to inhalers, nebulizers, and
oxygen to manage their asthma when they were at school.234 The parents
claimed that the LEA failed to implement the students' Section 504 plans
and retaliated against the mother and students after the parents obtained
counsel.235 The complaint alleged that the LEA forced the mother out of
her position as the PTA president, followed her on occasion, and restricted
her access to the school.236 The complaint further alleged that the students'
school did not follow a national contest's rules resulting in the students not
receiving an award, accused one of the students of plagiarism, denied one
of the students a place on the basketball team, and told one of the students
that her mother was not welcome at the school.237
The Eleventh Circuit held that what is now § 1415(l) required the
parents to exhaust IDEA remedies before bringing Section 504/ADA
claims. 8 The court relied on two other Circuits' cases, both of which held
221 Id. at 547 (citing Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748, 756 (2d Cir. 1987)).
229 Id. at 545, 547.
230 See id. at 547 ("[A] case encompassing analogous IDEA claims such as issues of FAPE and
identification, evaluation and placement, would require exhaustion.").
231 See supra Section V.B.2 (discussing differences in procedural requirements and substantive
standards between the IDEA and Section 504/ADA).
232 135 F.3d 1420 (11 th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
133Id. at 1420-21.
234 Id. at 1421 &n.6.
211 Id. at 1421.
136 Id. at 1421 n.7.
131Id. at 1421 n.8.
211 Id. at 1422.
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that Section 504/ADA claims are subject to the IDEA's exhaustion
requirement. 239 However, the court in Babicz failed to distinguish the fact
that the plaintiff-students in those cases who brought Section 504/ADA
claims were also eligible under the IDEA.240 Because those students were
double covered under both the IDEA and Section 504/ADA, an analysis
under § 1415(l) was appropriate in those cases. In contrast, the students in
Babicz were eligible under Section 504/ADA but did not receive services
under the IDEA.24' In a footnote, the court noted that under the IDEA's
eligibility criteria, the "other health impairment" disability category
includes asthma.242 The court then rejected the parents' argument that the
students required only related services but not special education-a fact
which would have precluded eligibility under the IDEA-as "meritless.
243
The court characterized that argument as merely an attempt to obtain
244compensatory damages, which are unavailable under the IDEA.
However, the students' eligibility for special education under the IDEA
category of other health impairment was not at issue in the case, and, in
any event, such a determination would have required an evaluation and a
determination by the LEA and parents. The issue was whether the Section
504/ADA claims on behalf of students who were only eligible under
Section 504/ADA were subject to the exhaustion requirement of § 1415(l).
The court answered that question by relying on cases in which the students
were double covered and by unilaterally casting the net of IDEA eligibility
over the Babicz children, who were only eligible under Section 504/ADA.
As another example, in Cudjoe v. Independent School District No.
12,245 a parent filed a complaint against the LEA for, among other things,
disability discrimination under Section 504/ADA.2 46  The student had a
diagnosis of Epstein-Barr virus, a condition that caused him to be so
fatigued that he could not attend class. 247 As a result, the student had a
Section 504 plan that allowed him to receive homebound instruction during
which a teacher would instruct him in his home at his grade level.248 The
student had not received services under the IDEA previously. 249 The
mother based her Section 504/ADA claims on allegations that the LEA
2 39 id.
240 See Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ. of Skokie Sch. Dist. 68, 98 F.3d 989, 990-91 (7th Cir. 1996)
(noting that the student received services under the IDEA); Hope v. Cortines, 872 F. Supp. 14, 18
(E.D.N.Y. 1995) (same), aff'd, 69 F.3d 687, 688 (2d Cir. 1995).
241 Babicz, 135 F.3d at 1421, 1422 n.l0.24 1Id. at 1422 n.10.
2 4 3 
Id.
244 Id.
245 297 F.3d 1058 (10th Cir. 2002).
246 1d. at 1060.




failed to provide instructional material to her son's teachers, hired teachers
other than those that the mother requested, and allowed additional school
personnel to attend the Section 504 meetings.250 The Tenth Circuit held
that § 1415(l) required the mother to exhaust her Section 504/ADA claims




In reaching its conclusion, the court determined that the mother sought
relief that was also available under the IDEA. 2 In deciding whether relief
was available under the IDEA, the court acknowledged that "[o]ne
plausible interpretation" is that the IDEA's "administrative remedies must
be available immediately to a person, thereby requiring that a student be
already identified, evaluated, and receiving special education pursuant to
IDEA.' '253 However, the court ultimately adopted a "broader construction"
and interpreted "available relief' to mean that "a student with a disability
who attempts to file a suit asserting that the school is not meeting his
educational needs may have to first assert his rights to be evaluated for
eligibility under the IDEA, before making appropriate demands for
hearings and procedures to address that claim.
254
Requiring a parent to not merely use the IDEA's administrative
procedures for Section 504/ADA claims, but also placing an affirmative
obligation on the parents to request eligibility under the IDEA before
asserting a claim under Section 504/ADA reaches far beyond even the
broadest reading of the text of § 1415(l). Even if one gave merit to the
interpretation that § 1415(l) requires parents to pursue Section 504/ADA
claims through the IDEA's hearing procedures-even when a student is
not eligible under the IDEA-nothing in the text of § 1415(l) suggests
parents must seek IDEA eligibility before pursuing Section 504/ADA
claims. Under Cudjoe's framework, for parents who choose not to seek an
IDEA evaluation for eligibility, this interpretation effectively waives their
rights to bring claims under Section 504/ADA even if they would have
pursued their Section 504/ADA claims via the IDEA's administrative
procedures.
The court also took it upon itself to assert that the student "appear[ed]"
to meet the eligibility criteria for "other health impairment" under the
IDEA based on his condition of "debilitating fatigue," which corresponds
with the definition of other health impairment that includes health
2
°Id. at 1062.
251 Id. at 1064, 1068.
252 Id. at 1068.
253 Id. at 1066.
254 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court also reiterated that parents cannot escape the
IDEA's exhaustion requirement by seeking compensatory damages and that whether relief is available
involves determining whether the IDEA can provide any redress to the claims. Id.
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problems that result in limited strength or vitality.255  The court then
concluded that the parent did not show that her son was ineligible under
the IDEA and that she therefore could have filed a due process request
pertaining to his identification and evaluation and used the IDEA's
procedural safeguards to address her son's FAPE. 256 Besides ignoring the
fact that eligibility determinations under the IDEA involve more than a
court's casual observation that a student "appears" to be eligible under the
IDEA,257 the court completely disregarded the second prong of IDEA
eligibility, which requires that, in addition to having one of the IDEA's
enumerated disabilities, a student must also require special education and
related services as a result of the disability.25 8 The court even noted earlier
in its opinion that the student's homebound instruction "consist[ed] of a
teacher coming to [the student's] house to teach him the normal curriculum
for his grade level, with the exception of his being excused from physical
education., 259 "Special education" under the IDEA involves adapting the
"content, methodology, or delivery of instruction." 260 The student in this
case received instruction in the normal curriculum at his grade level261 and,
therefore, arguably did not need special education, and, as a result, would
not be eligible under the IDEA. This omission in the court's analysis
highlights its misunderstanding of the differences between eligibility under
the IDEA and Section 504/ADA and, likely, the applicable procedural
safeguards.
C. The Proper Interpretation of§ 1415q) of the IDEA
The lack of jurisdiction of many states' hearing officers over purely
Section 504/ADA claims262 and the differences in the respective statutory
and regulatory schemes of the IDEA and Section 504/ADA in terms of
identification, evaluation, educational placement, FAPE, and procedural
safeguards lead to only one plausible interpretation of § 1415(). If a
student is eligible or seeking eligibility under the IDEA or is double
covered under both the IDEA and Section 504/ADA, and his or her parents
bring a claim based on Section 504/ADA, then § 1415() applies. In that
255 Id. at 1068.
256 Id.
257 id.
25 See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A) (2006) (providing that, to qualify as a "child with a disability"
under the IDEA, the child must, in addition to having an enumerated disability, need special education
and related services).
259 Cudoe, 297 F.3d at 1061 n.5.
26' 34 C.F.R. § 300.39(a)(1), (b)(3) (2010).
261 Cudjoe, 297 F.3d at 1061 n.5.
262 Zirkel & McGuire, supra note 168, at 106 ("[Rlelatively few states . . . have opened their
IDEA [impartial due process hearing] systems to claims under § 504 that are alternative to or instead of
those under the IDEA.").
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case, courts must determine whether the IDEA could have provided relief
for the parents' claims had they brought the claims under the IDEA. If so,
the parents cannot avoid the IDEA's due process procedures and must
exhaust their administrative remedies under the IDEA's procedures unless
the court finds that an exception applies, such as the inadequacy or futility
of the administrative review.263 If the IDEA could not have provided relief
for the Section 504/ADA claim, then the parents likewise would not have
to exhaust the IDEA's administrative remedies.
However, if a student is eligible under Section 504/ADA, but not under
the IDEA, and his or her parents wish to bring a claim based on Section
504/ADA, then the parents must follow the procedures of Section
504/ADA. Section 1415(l) and its exhaustion requirement would not apply
because the IDEA does not grant IDEA hearing officers jurisdiction over
purely Section 504/ADA claims, and therefore the IDEA could not provide
relief. Moreover, the IDEA cannot provide relief except for matters
relating to the identification, evaluation, educational placement, and
provision of FAPE based on IDEA standards,26 which are distinct from the
standards in the Section 504 regulations.
The legislative history of the HCPA also suggests the inapplicability of
§ 1415()'s exhaustion provision to students eligible only under Section
504/ADA. Both the House and Senate reports explain that, in enacting the
HCPA, Congress intended to overturn the Supreme Court's opinion in
Smith v. Robinson and its interpretation that the EHA preempted other
federal laws protecting the rights of individuals with disabilities. 265 While
the House Report's explanation of the exhaustion provision merely
paraphrases the provision's language,266 the Senate Report elucidates the
congressional intent of the provision, explaining:
[T]he EHA does not limit the applicability of other laws
which protect handicapped children and youth, except that
when a parent brings suit under another law when that suit
could have been brought under the EHA, the parent will be
required to exhaust EHA administrative remedies to the
same degree as would have been required had the suit been
brought under the EHA.267
This explanation shows that Congress envisioned that the provision
263 E.g., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 326-27 (1988) (citations omitted).
264 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6), (f) (2006).
265 S. REP. No. 99-112, at 2 (1985); H.R. REP. No. 99-296, at 4, 15 (1985).
266 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-296, at 7 ("[P]arents alleging violations of [S]ection 504... are required
to exhaust administrative remedies before commencing actions in court where exhaustion would be
required under EHA and the relief they seek is also available under EHA.").
267 S. REP. No. 99-112, at 3 (emphasis added).
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should apply only to Section 504/ADA suits on behalf of students who are
also eligible (or whose parents claim they are eligible) under the IDEA.
Otherwise, such a "suit could [not] have been brought under the
[IDEA], 268 since the only way parents may bring a claim under the IDEA
is to allege a violation of that statute.269
Another similar statement from the Senate Report explains that "when
parents choose to file a suit under another law," such as Section 504, then
parents must exhaust the IDEA's administrative remedies to the same
extent as would have been required "if that suit could have been filed
under" the IDEA.270  This statement suggests that the exhaustion
requirement applies to scenarios in which parents have a choice of whether
to file under Section 504 or the IDEA. The choice under that scenario
implies that a student would be double covered under both the IDEA and
Section 504/ADA. Otherwise, a parent would not have a choice whether to
pursue a claim under Section 504/ADA or the IDEA.
As noted, Congress enacted Section 1415() in response to the
Supreme Court's holding in Smith v. Robinson that the EHA preempted the
ability of parents of students with disabilities to pursue claims based on
violations of a Section 504.271 In Smith, the student's parents brought
claims under both the EHA and Section 504.272 It is that scenario-in
which a student is subject to the protections of both Section 504/ADA and
the IDEA-that provided the backdrop for Congress's enactment of the
HCPA and § 1415(o. With the HCPA, Congress intended to "re-
establish[] the relationship between [the] ElHA and [S]ection 504" and
"reaffirm[] the viability of [S]ection 504 ... as separate from but equally
viable with [the] EHA as vehicles for securing the rights of' students with
disabilities.273  This stated intention directly targets the Smith Court's
holding that the EHA precluded student claims based on Section 504.
Congress also intended that, in reestablishing Section 504 as an avenue for
students to pursue claims of disability discrimination, the HCPA should
not "allow parents to circumvent the due process procedures and
protections created under the EHA. 27 4  Thus, the legislative history
indicates that Congress intended the HCPA to allow students who receive
services under the IDEA to bring claims based on Section 504/ADA as
well as claims based on the IDEA. For those students who are double
covered under both the IDEA and Section 504, Congress clarified that they
268 Id at 3.
269 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6), (f), (k) (2006) (establishing the bases and procedures for a
complaint under the IDEA).
271 S. REP. No. 99-112, at 15 (emphasis added).
27 Id. at 2; H.R. REP. No. 99-296, at 4, 15.
272 Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 998, 1000 (1984).
273 H.R. REP. No. 99-296, at 6.
274 S. REP. No. 99-112, at 15.
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may not ignore the IDEA's due process procedures by choosing to file
under Section 504, thus avoiding the IDEA's exhaustion requirement.
For example, a student with a specific learning disability in math likely
would be double covered under both the IDEA and Section 504/ADA. If
that student required instruction in a special education classroom during
math class but did not need special education in other areas, and yet the
LEA placed her in a special education classroom for all subjects, her
parents likely would have a claim against the LEA for violating both the
IDEA's and Section 504's mandates that students with disabilities receive
their education with nondisabled peers to the maximum extent
appropriate.275 In this case, based on § 1415(/), the student's parents could
not avoid exhausting the IDEA's administrative remedies by choosing to
file a claim based on a violation of Section 504/ADA directly in court.
Because the LEA's conduct concerned a matter relating to the placement
of a student who was eligible under the IDEA, the parents clearly could
have brought their claim under the IDEA. As a result, § 1415() would
require the parents to exhaust the IDEA's administrative procedures before
filing a civil action in court based on Section 504/ADA.
A student eligible only under Section 504/ADA presents another
scenario altogether. For example, a student with severe asthma could be
eligible under Section 504/ADA because his impairment substantially
limits the major life activity of breathing. However, that student might be
ineligible under the IDEA because he does not require special education
and related services. If the student required an accommodation to carry an
inhaler for quick access, but the LEA refused to modify its policy of
requiring the school nurse to keep and administer all medication, the
student's parents potentially could have a claim for disability
discrimination under Section 504/ADA. Since the student is ineligible for
IDEA services, the parents could not bring a claim under the IDEA. As a
result, § 1415() would not apply to the parents' claim. The parents would
not be circumventing the IDEA's due process procedures because the LEA
did not violate the IDEA.
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Courts have recognized the policy arguments for requiring the
exhaustion of administrative remedies in the special education context
before proceeding to court. One potential benefit of exhaustion is that
administrative hearing officers with specialized knowledge and training
275 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2006) (requiring LEAs to educate students with disabilities with
children without disabilities to the maximum extent appropriate under the IDEA); 34 C.F.R. §
104.34(a) (2011) (requiring LEAs to educate students with disabilities with children without disabilities
to the maximum extent appropriate under Section 504).
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can use their expertise to make an initial determination about the adequacy
276
of a student's services and allow the LEA to correct deficiencies.
Another potential benefit is that administrative exhaustion allows the
creation of a detailed record, which courts can rely upon if a party seeks
judicial review.277  Furthermore, administrative exhaustion also can
"promot[e] accuracy, efficiency, agency autonomy, and judicial
economy.
278
Parties who can utilize the IDEA's due process hearing procedures-
namely, students who are eligible or seeking eligibility under the IDEA-
may receive the potential benefits associated with the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. Notwithstanding these potential
benefits, some courts misapply § 1415()'s exhaustion requirement to
students who are not eligible for the IDEA but who are eligible only under
Section 504/ADA. 279 These students find that in some jurisdictions IDEA
hearing officers do not have authority to hear purely Section 504/ADA
claims.280 It is true that courts might consider parents to have exhausted
their administrative remedies for their Section 504/ADA claims if they
raised those claims at an IDEA hearing and the hearing officer
subsequently dismissed the claims for lack of jurisdiction.28' Even so, in
those cases a hearing officer with specialized training will not make initial
determinations about the Section 504/ADA claims, the process will not be
efficient, and the hearing will produce no factual or evidentiary record to
assist the courts upon judicial review. This result renders the policy
arguments for requiring administrative exhaustion inapplicable within the
context of Section 504/ADA claims by students eligible solely under
Section 504/ADA.
If the exhaustion requirement of § 1415() does not apply to students
covered only by Section 504/ADA, then, currently, these students likely do
not have to exhaust available administrative remedies before filing an
action in court. On their own, neither Section 504 nor Title II of the ADA
276 E.g., Cudjoe v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 12, 297 F.3d 1058, 1065 (10th Cir. 2002); Polera v. Bd.
of Educ. of Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 288 F.3d 478, 487 (2d Cir. 2002); Frazier v. Fairhaven
Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 60-61 (1st Cir. 2002).
277 E.g., Cudjoe, 297 F.3d at 1065; Polera, 288 F.3d at 487 (citations omitted); Frazier, 276 F.3d
at 61. 278 Christopher W. v. Portsmouth Sch. Comm., 877 F.2d 1089, 1094 (1st Cir. 1989) (citing
McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194 (1969); Ezratty v. Puerto Rico, 648 F.2d 770, 774 (1st Cir.
1981)).
279 See supra Section V1.B.2 (discussing case law pertaining to exhaustion for students eligible
solely under Section 504/ADA).
280 See supra Section V.B. 1
281 See, e.g., E.S. v. Konocti Unified Sch. Dist., No. 1:10-cv-02245-NJV, 2010 WL 4780257, at
*4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2010) (finding plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies when he raised
Section 504 claims at an IDEA hearing, which the hearing officer dismissed based on lack of
jurisdiction to hear the claims).
[Vol. 44:1
contain an exhaustion requirement. 282  in fact, the regulations
implementing Title II of the ADA specify that "at any time, the
complainant may file a private suit pursuant to section 203" of the ADA.283
Section 203 of the ADA adopts the procedures available for claims under
Section 5 04 ,2 4 which, in turn, adopts the procedures available for claims
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.285 Courts have consistently
held that a plaintiff need not exhaust administrative remedies for Title VI
claims before filing in court.286 Additionally, in its analysis of the
regulations implementing Title II of the ADA, the U.S. Department of
Justice reiterated that Title II of the ADA "does not require exhaustion of
administrative remedies" and that "the complainant may elect to proceed
with a private suit at any time. 287
Given the lack of an express requirement to exhaust administrative
remedies within Section 504 and the ADA, Congress, through legislation,
or the U.S. Department of Education, through regulation, should clarify
this issue in one of several ways. First, policymakers may favor a system
where students with disabilities, whether covered by both the IDEA and
Section 504/ADA or only by Section 504/ADA, must pursue claims via the
IDEA's more formal due process system. If so, then Congress should
amend Section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act, which specifies the
procedures available under Section 504/ADA, to incorporate the IDEA's
administrative procedures for claims by public school students with
disabilities under Section 504/ADA, rather than the procedures of Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.288 Alternatively, the U.S. Department of
Education should issue new Section 504 regulations to specify that LEAs
must comply with the IDEA's due process procedures to meet Section
504's procedural safeguards requirement, which would replace the current
provision, which merely permits, but does not require, compliance with the
282 E.g., O'Guinn v. Lovelock Corr. Ctr., 502 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted);
Jeremy H. v. Mount Lebanon Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d 272, 281, 282 n.17 (3d Cir. 1996).
283 28 C.F.R. § 35.172(d) (2011) (emphasis added).
24 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2006) (adopting the "remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in" 29
U.S.C. § 794a).
28" 29 U.S.C. § 794a(2) (2006) (adopting the "remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964," 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7 (2006)).
286 E.g., Neighborhood Action Coal. v. City of Canton, Ohio, 882 F.2d 1012, 1015 (6th Cir. 1989)
(citations omitted) (noting that courts have "squarely h[e]ld that litigants need not exhaust their
administrative remedies prior to bringing a Title VI claim in federal court"); Cheyney State College
Faculty v. Hufstedler, 703 F.2d 732, 737 (3d Cir. 1983).
287 Appendix B to Part 35-Guidance on ADA Regulation on Nondiscrimination on the Basis of
Disability in State and Local Government Services Originally Published July 26, 1991, 28 C.F.R. Part
35 App. B (2011).
28 29 U.S.C. § 794a (providing the procedures available under Section 504 and adopting the
procedures of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7); 42 U.S.C. §
12133 (2006) (adopting the procedures of Section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794a).
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IDEA's procedures as a method of satisfying Section 504's requirement.289
Second, policymakers may prefer the less formal, 290 and likely less
costly, dispute resolution mechanism currently available under the Section
504 regulations29' for students covered only by Section 504/ADA, but may
still favor requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Accordingly, the U.S. Department of Education should issue new Section
504 regulations to clarify that parents must exhaust their remedies via
Section 504's less formal impartial due process hearing before they may
file in court.
Finally, notwithstanding the policy arguments in favor of exhausting
administrative remedies, policymakers may favor allowing parents of
students covered solely by Section 504/ADA the option of proceeding
directly to court with Section 504/ADA claims. Some courts have not
required exhaustion for Section 504/ADA claims based on certain
conduct292 or seeking particular remedies.293 Implicit in such holdings is
that courts are capable of adjudicating those claims despite the lack of prior
administrative review. Moreover, claims based on Section 504 and Title II
of the ADA, arising in contexts other than that of students with disabilities,
generally do not require the exhaustion of administrative remedies.294
However, on balance, the benefits of requiring administrative
exhaustion for students eligible only under Section 504/ADA outweigh the
benefits of proceeding directly to court. Determining appropriate
programs, services, and placements for students with disabilities is unlike
the traditional discrimination inquiry into whether an entity's actions
resulted in the disparate treatment of, or impact on, a member of a
protected class. Instead of asking whether an LEA treated a student
differently because of his or her disability, the question is what specific
accommodations, modifications, and services the student needs to obtain a
FAPE. This question is complex, and, as a result, it is preferable for the
parties to create a record before a trained hearing officer who makes the
289 34 C.F.R. § 104.36 (2011).
290 See Zirkel & McGuire, supra note 168, at 106-07 (noting that Section 504's regulations do not
include timelines or hearing officer appointment procedures and, based on OCR guidance, do not
require court reporters or the right to cross-examination during Section 504 hearings).
291 34 C.F.R. § 104.36.
292 See, e.g., M.P. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 721, 439 F.3d 865, 868 (8th Cir. 2006) (alleging
discrimination); Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 233 F.3d 1268, 1274-75 (10th Cir. 2000) (seeking relief for
physical injuries); O'Hayre v. Bd. of Educ. for Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-I, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1284,
1294 (D. Colo. 2000) (alleging discrimination).
293 See, e.g., Witte v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 1271, 1275 (9th Cir. 1999), overruled on
other grounds by Payne v. Peninsula Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (seeking money
damages); Jeffery Y. v. St. Mary's Area Sch. Dist., 967 F. Supp. 852, 855 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (same).
294 E.g., O'Guinn v. Lovelock Corr. Ctr., 502 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted);
Jeremy H. v. Mount Lebanon Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d 272, 281, 282 n.17 (3d Cir. 1996).
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initial decision. Moreover, given that the substantive and procedural rights
under Section 504/ADA are less robust than those under the IDEA, it
makes sense for the administrative hearing procedures under Section
504/ADA to be less formal than the IDEA's procedures. As a result,
Congress or the Department of Education should clearly specify that
parents of students eligible only under Section 504/ADA must exhaust
Section 504/ADA hearings before proceeding to court.
Yet, in the absence of congressional or administrative action
concerning the issue of administrative exhaustion for claims by students
covered only by Section 504/ADA, courts must clarify their conceptual
understanding of the substantive and procedural differences between the
IDEA and Section 504/ADA. As a related matter, courts must understand
whether a parent's Section 504/ADA claim is in addition to or in the
alternative of an IDEA claim versus whether a parent is seeking relief via
Section 504/ADA because his or her child is not eligible under the IDEA
and therefore Section 504/ADA is the only viable avenue. Careful analysis
of these issues will allow courts to determine correctly whether the IDEA's
procedures should apply through § 1415(/) or whether Section 504/ADA's
independent procedures apply.
VII. CONCLUSION
Section 1415() of the IDEA allows parents to bring claims against
LEAs based on laws other than the IDEA, such as Section 504/ADA, but
requires that parents exhaust the IDEA's administrative due process
procedures before filing in court if the IDEA could also provide relief.2 95
Correctly interpreted, this provision governs the Section 504/ADA claims
of students covered by or seeking coverage of the IDEA. Section 1415()
thereby specifies that the IDEA does not preclude parents of students
covered by the IDEA from bringing claims based on Section 504/ADA,
rebuking the Supreme Court decision in Smith v. Robinson that held to the
contrary. Courts and hearing officers, apparently confused by the
overlapping coverage of the IDEA and Section 504/ADA and their
independent procedural safeguards, have misapplied the exhaustion
provision of § 1415(). They erroneously have required parents to exhaust
their Section 504/ADA claims under the IDEA's due process procedures
even when a student is not eligible for services under the IDEA.296 Courts
have reached this result despite many IDEA hearing officers' lack of
jurisdiction over Section 504/ADA claims and the fact that the substantive
standard and procedural requirements differ under the IDEA and Section
295 20 U.S.C. § 1415(/) (2006).
296 See supra Section V.B.2.
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504/ADA. 297 Courts must clarify their understanding of the similarities
and differences between the IDEA and Section 504/ADA, and
policymakers must clarify their intent regarding whether parents must
exhaust Section 504/ADA claims when the student is eligible only under
Section 504/ADA. The failure to do so will result in many students with
disabilities, covered by Section 504/ADA but not by the IDEA, continuing
to face procedural obstacles and dead ends in their attempts to seek
appropriate services and redress for discrimination.
297 See supra Section V.B.
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